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ABSTRACT
Children between the ages of 4 and 9 were presented with 5
quantitative problems. Each of the problems was ambiguous as to
optimal strategy, counting or measurement. The basic hypothesis was
that incidental learning would increase with uncertainty about
appropriate strategy choice. Uncertainty was measured by inconsistent
strategy choices and frequency of strategy shifting. After solving
the problems, the child was asked to draw each set of stimuli. The
drawings were coded for recall of stimulus dimensions relevant to
both strategies and irrelevant information.
The data support the following sequence of learning appropriate
strategy choice. The unsophisticated child tends to rely on counting
when the problem requires the comparison of more than two objects.
When the child begins to recognize problem ambiguity with regard to
strategy, s/he searches to delineate relevant from irrelevant attributes
of the stimuli. A consequence of this search is increased incidental
learning. The child then begins to experiment with the alternative
strategies, trying to resolve any perceived inconsistencies between
stimulus features, the problem strategies and the resulting solutions.
After the child has resolved these inconsistencies, information rele-
vant to the inappropriate strategy is no longer a focus of the child's
attention.
Boys were found to score higher than girls on the strategy
shifting and expertise measures, but not on the relevant and irrele-
iv
vant memory measures. These individual differences suggest that
previous description of how children learn appropriate quantitative
strategy choices requires at least some further refinement.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Overview
How do children select the appropriate problem solving strategy?
For example, given the problem of determining how many rolls of paper
to buy in order to line kitchen shelves, most adults realize that a
measurement strategy, to determine area, would be more economical than
counting the shelves and buying an equal number of paper rolls. Yet,
to children the appropriate solution strategy is not so obvious. What
do adults realize about the nature of the problem that young children
do not?
One might argue that since a child doesn't know how to use a
ruler and compute the area, the correct strategy is not available to
the child. However, using a ruler and computing the respective areas
is not the only appropriate measurement strategy; the child could
open a paper roll and see how many shelves fit on the roll. Such a
strategy would not occur to many young children and they would probably
count, undaunted by its inappropriateness . Strategy availability alone
does not answer the question of how children learn to select appro-
priate problem solving strategies. They must learn to recognize some-
thing about the nature of the problem, namely, what aspects are relevant
for choosing an appropriate strategy. The development of appropriate
strategy use is the concern of this research. A developmental pro-
gression in the appropriate selection of problem solving strategies
for problems of quantity is hypothesized, and incidental learning is
identified as a possible consequence of resolving strategy ambiguity.
Background
Actually, very little research or theory has addressed the
specific relationship between learning to recognize relevant environ-
mental cues and choosing appropriate problem solving strategies. There-
fore, no research can be presented which specifically tests the major
hypothesis of this paper. However, Piaget's theory of progressive
equilibration is directly pertinent to the theoretical position out-
lined and will be reviewed, with particular emphasis on the short-
comings in its application to research problems. In addition, Gelman's
work with preschool children's counting will be discussed, as it pertains
to the Piagetian position and the present research. Prior work on
incidental learning in children is reviewed in considerable detail,
but this research has been found to be restricted in scope and
theoretically simplistic. The accepted conclusions are criticized
and a more complex theoretical orientation suggested, specifically,
an interactive system, between the predisposition of the child,
strategy choice, and memory.
The Piagetian perspective : Global theory
.
Piaget (1977) theorizes
that the child learns through a process of progressive equilibration.
A child is content with his or her understanding of the environment
until a conflict within that understanding becomes apparent. The
conflict induces a state of disequil ibration which is resolved
through a progressive cycle of cognition, interaction with the
environment, and observation. The cycle, which Piaget calls pro-
gressive equilibration, continues until a new, more sophisticated,
understanding of the environment is attained.
Equilibration theory has not proved to be a useful guide in
exploring developmental processes because of two major problems.
First, the changes which occur during disequilibration are within the
child and Piaget does not delineate consistent observable behaviors
during this important interval of the process. Piaget does outline
beta behaviors, systematic testing of the environment by alternating
the use of one of two unidimensional systems of understanding rather
than choosing a behavior based on the complete integrated system
(Gruber and Voneche, 1977). In his experiments, however, he has not
attempted to quantify this type of behavior, and see how it relates
to consequent behaviors. Piaget predicts how responses on particular
tasks will differ once the child has made the transition from one
stage to the next, but the data concerning the transition itself is
weak, primarily anecdotal descriptions of the child's performance.
The stages of development as defined by Piaget (e.g. preopera-
tional
,
concrete and formal operations) are too global to be useful
in delineating the learning process. Success on the conservation of
volume task for example, may mark the transition from preoperational
to concrete operational thought, but it is the culmination of several
years of the child's learning and tells us little of how this goal
was reached. The study of learning processes in children requires
4a closer look at the child's conflicts and changes in understanding
during each of Piaget's stages of development. The discovery and
description of these minor transitions will begin to provide a
framework from which inferences can be made regarding the structure
of the child's knowledge and the nature of the learning process.
Gelman (1978) has pointed out the importance of studying chil-
dren's learning from the child's rather than adult's point of view.
She states that it would be more fruitful to interpret the child's
behavior in terms of what s/he already understands and see how that
understanding affects present and future interaction in the environ-
ment, rather than to focus on the deficits in the child's thinking and
the distance from a future cognitive goal. With this perspective,
she has been able to delineate transitions in the child's understand-
ing of number concepts before conservation of number has been attained
Gelman has recognized 5 basic principles necessary for the
effective use of counting strategies, and has demonstrated preschool
behaviors consistent with those principles. The acquisition of each
of these principles indicates a progression in the child's understand-
ing of number. It is from these relatively minor transitions in the
child's progressive development that inferences can be made about
what knowledge is necessary for further understanding.
The delineation of these minor transitions, their natural se-
quence and the relative difficulty of specific knowledge domains,
can begin to reveal how the child structures incoming information.
However, the recognition of minor transitions alone will not solve
the first problem suggested, i.e., help to ascertain whether the fun-
damental impetus for change is disequil ibration. It is first nec-
essary to pinpoint those behaviors which will coincide with the inter-
nal state of disequil ibration.
According to Piaget's theory, transitions between levels of
understanding will coincide with internal conflict. When the learning
which is occurring is the development of a heuristic, or rule of thumb,
for appropriate strategy use, it seems reasonable that the conflict
during the transition interval will involve uncertainty regarding
strategy choice. In other words, the internal conflict during tran-
sition may be directly observed as strategy uncertainty, given that
measures which accurately reflect uncertainty are found. Time nec-
essary to solve the problem, shifting strategy choices within a
problem, and inconsistent strategy choices across similar problems,
might be considered reasonable measures of uncertainty, and be ex-
pected to increase with the state of disequil ibration. If these
measures provide a method of recognizing the child in transition,
it is reasonable to ask how the processing of environmental information
differs during di sequi 1 i bration
.
A specific prediction might be that children who are uncertain
as to appropriate strategy choice on a problem will process more
incidental environmental information than children who are more certain
of their strategy choice. Since recognition of the relevant aspects
of the problem for appropriate strategy choice may not yet be learned,
the child does not know what information is relevant to determining the
optimal strategy. As the child searches to delineate those aspects
of the stimuli which are relevant to appropriate strategy choice from
those which are irrelevant, more irrelevant incidental information is
processed when compared to the child who is not uncertain and conse-
quently not engaged in a search to determine strategy. I
The incidental learning tradition; empirical efforts . There are two
accepted definitions of incidental learning (Postman, 1964). Type
A refers to learning which has occurred without explicit instructions
to remember. The levels of processing experiments define incidental
learning in this manner and the Russian definition of involuntary
memory is Type A incidental learning. The second definition, Type B,
has been the concern of researchers from the behaviorist and infor-
mation processing traditions. These experiments have addressed the
issue of how an organism filters out irrelevant information and comes
to selectively attend to relevant attributes of the stimuli. Inciden
tal learning is defined, by these researchers, as memory for infor-
mation irrelevant to the central task. Both definitions incorporate
the notion of memory without explicit instructions, but only Type B
requires that the remembered information also be irrelevant to the
central task. This study was concerned with changes in Type B
incidental learning.
There were several experiments conducted in the late 1960's
and early 1970's on incidental learning in children. Most of the
research was done by either Hagen and Hale and their associates or
Stevenson and his associates. In general, the design of the exper-
iments used in both groups were similar and quite limited. The con-
clusions regarding incidental learning in children, which have been
drawn from these studies, are quite broad in their implications and
bold, considering the limitations of the experimental design.
In one of the first studies of incidental learning in children
(Maccoby and Hagen, 1965), 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 7th graders were
presented with colored cards with pictures of animals pasted on each.
After viewing each card it was placed face down in front of the child
forming a linear array, and the child was asked to point to the card
position matching a colored chip held by the experimenter. Once it
was established through repeated testing that color and serial position
were the central features of the stimuli, the children were asked
to remember which animal picture went with each background color. The
authors had expected to find a reciprocal relationship between
incidental learning and intentional learning. In other words, as
incidental memory decreased, intentional memory would increase, which
would be a finding consistent with Broadbent's (1958) limited capacity
model of selective attention which was a popular research model at
that time. The authors did not find a significant correlation between
intentional and incidental scores and concluded "that the processing
of central and incidental information are not reciprocal" (p. 287).
Maccoby and Hagen consider that they may have found an incidental
learning curve, increasing from 1st to 5th grade and decreasing at
the 7th grade, corresponding to changes in information processing
abilities with development and/or learning. However, their final
8conclusion rejects the possibility of a relationship between inciden-
tal and intentional learning.
"That the two processes (intake of task-relevant versus
task-irrelevant information) may be largely independent
is further indicated by our finding that the two kinds
of scores are not correlated..." (p. 289).
An essentially identical experiment substituting pictures of household
objects for colors, resulted in similar findings (Hagen, 1967).
Siegel and Stevenson (1966) found a curvilinear relationship
between incidental learning and age. The subjects were presented with
a three-choice successive discrimination problem followed by a similar
presentation of each of the discriminative stimuli (e.g. truck)
embedded in a stimulus complex of several objects. An incidental
object was then presented without the original discriminative stimulus
and the subjects were tested as to whether they could make the response
to the incidental object that had been correct for the discriminative
stimulus. Incidental learning was found to increase from 7 to 12
years and decrease from 12 to 14 years.
Stevenson (1970) concludes that:
"What causes S to demonstrate a high degree of incidental
learning is not clear, but whatever the bases, they are
apparently not the same as those producing a high degree
of intentional learning." (p. 911)
This conclusion is based on the lack of a significant negative cor-
relation between incidental and intentional learning, which again
is not consistent with a limited capacity selective attention model.
Stevenson (1972) also cites results from two-choice discrimi-
nation experiments (Lubker, 1967; Osier and Kofsky, 1965) as evidence
9that irrelevant information has a negative effect on learning.
"There is little doubt that the presence of irrelevant
information interferes with children's learning,
especially when children are young." (p. 228)
He advocates an educational method restricting superfluous stimulus
features
.
"We can make learning easier for children... by eliminating
irrelevant information, for they have a hard time doing
this for themselves." (p. 230)
Gibson (1969) found better incidental memory in 5 year olds
than in 9 year olds. She presented colored letters to the younger
children and artificial graphemes to the older children in which
the central task was letter or grapheme identification. After
having reached criteria on the central task, the children were pre-
sented with the letter or grapheme in black print, and were asked to
recall the color that had accompanied the letter. The 5 year olds
remembered as many or more colors than letters and 9 year olds remem-
bered color at chance levels. She maintains that color salience was
not a factor in the results because a similar pattern was obtained
with color relevant and letter or grapheme irrelevant. Gibson also
concludes that maturational changes in the ability to selectively
attend may cause these differences. It is of particular interest,
however, that she found a decline of incidental learning before
age 9, which is counter to Hagen and Stevenson's arguments of
maturational changes in selective attention at ages 12 or 13.
In an attempt to study incidental learning in a more natural-
istic setting, Hale et. al . (1968) conducted an experiment in which
children were assessed on incidental memory after viewing an eight
minute film. Incidental memory was found to increase from grades
3 to 6 and drop at grade 7. The average score for all grades was
significantly higher for girls. The correlation between I.Q. and
incidental learning was positive and statistically significant in
six of the ten subgroups. The authors suggest that the incidental
learning curve is related to developmental differences in the ability
to disregard nonessential features of the situation, and the sex
differences may have been due to the film content, which depicted a
social situation perhaps more interesting to the girls.
A similar study by Hawkins (1973) found that learning of content
peripheral to the central plot of a film which was geared to a 5 to
10 year old age group, steadily increased from 3rd to 9th grade,
whereas, incidental learning was curvilinear with age for a film
geared toward adults, increasing from 3rd to 7th grade and dropping
in 9th grade. Hawkins has no general theory as to why he obtained
these differences but does point out that his data indicates that
the incidental learning curve may not be as general a phenomenon as
it appeared from previous research, and that the relationship is more
complex than previously supposed.
Hawkin's conclusions regarding the complex nature of incidental
learning is further supported in that incentive has been shown to
have a positive effect on incidental learning. Kausler et. al . (1963)
found that 7th and 8th graders had greater incidental memory when told
they could win money. The experimental format was a serial learning
list in which form was paired with color. After learning the list
on the basis of form, the children were tested for memory of color-
form pairings. In contrast, a similar study by Wray (1968) found
no significant difference between children offered fifty cents on
the intentional task and those not offered money.
In summary, the findings and conclusions from prior research
on incidental learning in children is inconclusive. Most of the
research used simple designs of either serial learning or discrim-
ination tasks. In general, these experiments find a curvilinear
relationship between incidental learning and age, peaking at about
12 or 13 years. The authors tend to conclude that a developmental
change in the ability to filter out irrelevant aspects of the stimuli
is the responsible factor. A correlation between incidental and
intentional learning has not been found, and therefore these re-
searchers have rejected the idea of a relation between incidental
and intentional learning, advocating the elimination of irrelevant
stimulus properties when teaching younger children.
Evidence from other experiments suggests that the above ex-
planation is not complete. Gibson (1969) found a decrease in incidental
learning before age 9, and Hawkins (1973) found a linear relationship
with age, for children between the 3rd and 9th grade, when assessing
memory of a film geared to 5 to 10 year olds. Hale et al . (1968)
found a significant sex difference in incidental learning as well as
a positive correlation with I.Q., and Kausler et.al. (1963) found
differences with monetary incentive. These findings would suggest
12
that incidental learning phenomenon are more complex than previously
believed, on the basis of earlier, simpler experiments. Although
maturation may be an important factor in changes in incidental
learning, obviously other factors also play an important role.
Pick (1975) reviews the incidental learning research criti-
cizing its limitation in scope and bold conclusions. She points
out that remembering a sequence in a two-dimensional array may not
represent the type of information usually designated as relevant
to young children in most learning situations and that even those
studies which have not required serial learning still rely on two-
dimentional stimuli. Generalizations regarding children's learning
in a three-dimensional environment, therefore, may be inappropriate.
In addition the following criticisms may be made concerning
prior methodology: The children were usually instructed as to how
to approach the central task. There were no opportunities for the
child to chose a strategy or determine for himself what attributes
might be relevant to solving the problem. Also, a child's performance
was never evaluated across tasks to see if the amount of incidental
learning remained relatively constant or varied systematically.
A more global criticism of prior work on incidental learning
is the general theoretical orientation toward the development of
information processes. The behaviori stic definition of learning
as; "increased performance over time" and Broadbent's (1958) simple
model of selective attention have led to fairly restricted inquiries
into incidental learning. As a result, simplistic and perhaps
dangerously false assumptions have been made about children's learning
These types of conclusions are inevitable because a basic linear model
of information processing is the only model being considered. The
inadequacy of this model is strongly suggested, in that, age, sex,
motivation and I.Q. can all potentially effect incidental learning
depending on the task. It would seem that a more complex, interac-
tive model of learning would be more appropriate than a simple linear
model and conclusions regarding a lack of a relationship between
incidental and intentional learning is premature (Brown, 1981).
Although there may be a strong developmental component to
changes in incidental learning, this fact would not rule out the
possibility of a relationship between learning and irrelevant memory.
Incidental learning may, in fact, be an important component of the
process of learning to selectively attend in natural problem solving
situations, where the ability to recognize and transfer information
across similar problems as well as the ability to abstract rules is
vital
.
McGraw (1978) also theorizes that incidental learning may play
a critical role in the development of concepts and heuristic problem-
solving strategies. He points out that in order to reach a solution
it is often necessary to attend to information that is either cog-
nitively or perceptually peripheral to the task (p. 55). If the
child is uncertain what information is central, it must be imperative
that his or her processing include peripheral as well as central
information. This potential aspect of incidental learning can not
be discovered unless the theoretical models and subsequent experimen
tal designs become more complex in the following ways: a) testing
children on more than one task, b) providing complex stimuli which
more effectively represent irrelevant features in the natural en-
vironment, c) designing problems which allow alternative strategies,
and d) measuring variables, other than age, that may relate to learn
ing and incidental memory.
Statement of the Problem
This study focused on the child's use of problem solving stra-
tegies for problems of quantity and the relation between strategy
use and relevant and irrelevant memory. In each of 5 problems, the
child was presented with an array of objects and asked whether one
set of elements in the array had more than another set, or if they
had the same amount. The strategies used were enumerated, and
later recall was assessed.
The children were expected to choose one of three strategies
in reaching a conclusion about a particular problem: a perceptual,
counting or measurement strategy. A perceptual strategy was defined
as a visual judgement made without directly interacting with the
materials. A counting strategy was fixing a quantity label on one
set of objects, by labeling each individual element, completing the
same procedure with the other set of objects and comparing the two
quantity labels for number.
A counting strategy required a comparison for number, whereas
a measurement strategy required a comparison for size. The definition
of measurement used in this study differed from Piaget's (Flavell,
1963). Piaget requires the use of an external standard, such as a
rod or ruler, and counting the number of standard units for compar-
ison. Most children don't perform this procedure until about 7 or
8 years. Yet, younger children are able to recognize a measurement
problem and perform an effective measurement strategy without the
use of an external standard unit (e.g. standing back to back to com-
pare heights, comparing slices of cake or amount of liquid in two
glasses). Early measurement does not entail the use of an external
standard and counting, but the transformation of the objects, in
position or arrangement, so that a standard unit can be found within
the objects themselves and a comparison for size made.
Piaget has maintained that one-to-one correspondence is a
primitive counting strategy. In this study, however, behaviors
considered to reflect one-to-one correspondence were recognized as
either a counting or measurement strategy, depending on the behavior
and intention of the child. If the child was matching objects to
make an overall comparison for number only, the strategy was con-
sidered a counting strategy. If, however, the child was making a
size comparison between objects as they were matched, the strategy
was considered measurement.
The children were between the ages of 4 and 9 years. In general,
the youngest and oldest children were expected to be relatively
certain of their strategy choices, because they would not recognize
16
the ambiguity with regard to strategy choice. Children who were
unsophisticated in their understanding of the problems were ex-
pected to consistently use perceptual and counting strategies, re-
gardless of the nature of the problem. These children would not
yet recognize the strategy options available within the problem
itself and would tend to rely on a familiar and direct quantitative
strategy, counting or perceptual judgement. The older children,
were expected to recognize the differences between problems and the
strategy options within each problem, but were expected to have
resolved any ambiguity as to appropriate strategy choice. Conse-
quently, they were expected to be certain and rapid in their problem
solving strategies, choosing and executing the optimal strategy for
each problem efficiently and correctly.
In general, the children representing the middle ages were
expected to be more uncertain as to strategy choice. These children
would choose the optimal strategy on some but not all of the problems.
They were expected to shift strategies more frequently within problems
because of internal conflict as to appropriate strategy, and occasion-
ally resolve the problem incorrectly even though the correct strategy
had been employed. These uncertain strategists were also expected
to have a higher recall of irrelevant problem information, because
the attempt to resolve strategy ambiguity may involve the delineation
of relevant and irrelevant aspects of the stimuli.
Because strategy knowledge or expertise was expected to be the
determinant of these behaviors rather than age jp_er se , a scale of
expertise was used to test these predictions. Each child was scored
for the number of times the optimal strategy was used and led to the
correct answer, across the 5 problems. The scale was considered to
represent children at various points in the process of learning
appropriate counting and measurement use.
In summary, three major predictions were postulated.
1) A behavior such as increased strategy use would be found
to be curvilinear to expertise. Children at mid-expertise
levels were expected to be more uncertain as to appropriate
strategy choice, therefore more inclined to shift strategies
in trying to solve the problems. This finding would provide
evidence of observable behaviors during the process of learning
appropriate strategy choice.
2) Recall for incidental information would be greatest for children
at mid-expertise levels, because a component of learning to
chose a strategy is differentiating relevant from irrelevant
problem information. The finding would support the contention
that a relationship exists between learning and irrelevant
memory.
3) The behavior expected to increase at mid-expertise levels,
strategy shifting or cumulative strategies employed, would
reflect the search process to delineate relevant from irrele-
vant problem information. Therefore, irrelevant incidental
memory was expected to be a linear function of cumulative
strategies employed. This finding would specify the relation-
ship between learning and irrelevant memory, by associating
high incidental learning with an observable behavior.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Material
s
The furniture necessary for the study was a table, two chairs
and a bookshelf to hold the trays for each problem. In addition
a stopwatch and a "Peek-a-boo Block" toy manufactured by Fischer-
Price was used to indicate time limits on the problems. Recording
equipment included a tape recorder and cassette tapes, data sheets,
drawing paper and drawing pens in 9 different colors (green, pink,
orange, purple, yellow, red, blue, black and brown).
The objects for each of the 6 problems were placed on indi-
vidual cookie sheet trays (17 in. X 11 in. XI in.) and covered
with plastic lids. The bottom of each tray was covered with white
posterboard to provide a uniform white background for all the objects.
The particular details of each problem are specified exactly below
because they were relevant to the memory segment of the experiment.
The farm problem (warm-up) . The warm-up materials consisted of
farm animals and fence toys manufactured by Fisher-Price. Five
pieces of fence, a watering trough, a dog, pig, cow, horse, chicken
and rooster constituted the set.
Ping pong ball problem . The objects for this problem consisted
of a bowl containing 9 ping pong balls and a metal paint tray with
10 individual dips for paint. The bowl was an orange margarine bowl
19
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cone-like in shape, 15.5 cm. in diameter at the top and 8.5 cm.
at the bottom. The ping pong balls were 3.5 cm. in diameter. Five
balls were white with the name of the nanufacturer stamped on them,
"All-Pro Taiwan" and three stars, forming a triangle, above the
writing. Four balls were yellow with "Made in England" stamped on
the surface. The paint tray was circular, 18.5 cm. in diameter,
with 10 circular dips, equally spaced around the periphery. Each
dip was approximately 3.7 cm. in diameter and .8 cm. deep. The
center of the silver tray had a circular indentation approximately
8.5 cm. in diameter with the manufacturer's name etched within the
indentation, "M. Grumbacher Inc. No. 852. Hong Kong".
Pegboard problem
. The objects for this problem consisted of a
pegboard with 8 pegs prearranged to form a square, and a piece of
posterboard with 8 holes cut out in the same square arrangement.
The pegboard was white (16 cm. X 21.5 cm.) with 22 by 38 small holes
for pegs. The 8 pegs were red and circular and prearranged to form
the four corner points and four midline points on the perimeter of
a square. The pegs were .9 cm. in diameter, and the distance between
two adjacent pegs was approximately 1.7 cm., resulting in a square
approximately 6 cm. X 6 cm. The posterboard card (13 cm. X 13 cm.)
was white with 8 circular holes cut out of it. The holes corresponded
to the same 8 points formed by the pegs, but were wider than the pegs
(approximately 1.5 cm. in diameter), and the distance between adjacent
holes was about 1 cm. Each of the holes on the posterboard was
circular and outlined in one of four colors, blue, yellow, pink or
21
green. There were two holes outlined in each color and no two holes
of the same outline color were adjacent. One of the blue holes had
a square outer outline shape and the other blue hole had a petal-
like outer outline. The other holes had a circular outline.
Pie problem
.
The objects for this problem consisted of 5 red pieces
of posterboard and 5 blue pieces of posterboard, cut to represent
pieces of pie. Each piece of pie was wedge-shaped, straight on
two sides and curved on the third. The length of the straight sides
(radius of the completely formed pie) was equal for all the pie
pieces, 6.2 cm., but the angle at which these lines met was variable,
therefore the length of the curved side and area of each pie piece
was variable. The angles for each of the five blue pieces were,
14°, 47°, 63°, 108°, and 128°; thus all the pieces could form one
whole pie of 360°. The angles for each of the five red pieces were,
32°, 35°, 68°, 115°, and 145°; four of the pieces could form a
complete pie of 360° and there was an extra piece of 35°.
Sand container problem . The objects for this problem consisted
of 8 clear, stackable, plastic food containers with removable color
tops. All the containers were equal width (12 cm.) and depth (7 cm.)
but two were tall (22 cm.) and six were short (5.5 cm.). The
volume ratio of the short total! containers was 4 to 1 . In other
words, if four of the short containers were stacked, they would
equal the height of one of the tall containers. The two tall con-
tainers had orange tops, four of the short containers had brown
22
tops and the remaining two short containers had white tops.
Caterpillar block problem
. The objects for this problem consisted
of 4 blue cube blocks glued to form a pillar and 5 green cube blocks
glued to form a slightly shorter stack. The pillars of glued blocks
were presented as caterpillars composed of block sections. Each
block in the blue caterpillar was a 3.3 cm. cube. There were 4
blocks in the blue pillar so the height was 13.2 cm. Each block
in the green caterpillar was a 2.6 cm. cube. Since there were 5
blocks in the green pillar the total height was 13.0 cm. Each of
the caterpillars had a white face glued to the side of the top cube
of the pillar. The faces were made of posterboard and circular
(1.5 cm. in diameter), the outline of the face and nose were black,
and the mouths were red. The eyes on the green caterpillar were
blue and the eyes on the blue caterpillar were green.
Subjects
The children were recruited from the Living and Learning Day
Care Centre and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd grades at Fort River Elemen-
tary School. A description of the study and a consent form were
either mailed directly to the parent or sent home via the child.
The recruitment techniques and general procedure were approved by
the University of Massachusetts Human Subjects Committee.
Sixty subjects participated in the study, 23 from the Living
and Learning Centre, 21 from a combined 1st and 2nd grade classroom
at Fort River School and 16 from a 3rd grade class, also at Fort
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River. The age of the participants was from 4 years to 9 years
and 1 month. One 8 year old girl was omitted from the analysis
because of a previously diagnosed learning dysfunction. Of the
remaining 28 girls and 31 boys, the mean ages were 6 years-8 months
and 6 years-6 months, respectively.
Procedure
Problem-solving segment
. Each child accompanied the female ex-
perimenter to a small room, and sat at the table opposite the exper
imenter and equipment. The experimenter explained the function of
some of the equipment to diminish the child's curiosity during the
session.
"I'm interested in the things you do and say while we're working
on some problems, so I have these papers to write things down. I
also have a tape recorder to help me remember after we're finished.
This is "Squeaky". He pops up and squeaks. Would you like to try?
(The experimenter demonstrates and offers the child the squeeze
bulb.) He'll pop up like that when it's time to go on to the next
problem. I make Squeaky work, and know when the time is up because
I have this stopwatch."
The general procedure was then outlined for the child, e.g.,
"I'll put one of these trays with a cover in front of you.
I'll lift the cover and ask you a question about the things on the
tray. Use the things on the tray to try and find the answer. Squeaky
will tell us when it's time to cover the tray again. Are you ready?"
The first problem to be presented, the farm, was designed as
a warm-up task. The child was asked to set up the farm. There was
no actual time limit but Squeaky was operated by the experimenter
5 seconds after the child completed setting up the farm. The ra-
tional behind this procedure was to accustom the child to manipu-
lating objects on the tray and to give the child the impression that
there would be ample but not unlimited time on each of the problems.
The remaining five problems were presented to the children
in random order. Before the cover was lifted the experimenter pro-
vided a name for each of the problems (e.g., "This is the Ping Pong
Ball problem.").
A suitable time limit for each problem, either one or two
minutes, had been determined during piloting. Every child was
exposed to a problem for the same predetermined length of time.
The basic question for each problem was whether one set of
elements had more area, volume, or number, than another set of
elements or whether they were the same. The child's behaviors,
answers and their temporal order were recorded during each problem.
The coding sheet grouped behaviors as components of a measurement
or counting strategy. The behavioral components comprising a measure
ment strategy were not consistent across problems, so will be des-
cribed below with each problem procedure, but the components of the
counting strategy were consistent across problems, and are described
once here. A counting strategy was broken into 4 components: 1) be-
gin to count elements in set A; 2) count all elements in set A;
3) then begin to count elements in set B; and 4) count all elements
in set B. Children's counting behavior was evident by touching or
pointing to the objects sequentially, and counting aloud, or silent
counting with lip movement. If it was not obvious whether the child
had counted, the child was asked how s/he knew the answer. If the
child answered a problem without counting or interacting with the
objects to show a measurement strategy, the behavior was coded as
a perceptual judgement strategy.
Pin g pong ball problem . The dips on the paint tray and ping
pong balls in the bowl were pointed out, and the child asked whether
there were more dips or more ping pong balls or if they were the
same. The measurement strategy was broken into three behavioral
components: 1) place a ball in a dip; 2) place all the balls in the
dips; and 3) notice the remaining slot. The time limit for this
problem was 1 minute.
Pegboard problem
. The pegboard was presented with a side
parallel to the edge of the table, i.e., as a square, whereas the
cardboard square was placed on a point, as a diamond. The pegs on
the pegboard and holes in the cardboard were pointed out to the
child, who was asked whether there were more pegs or more holes,
or if they were the same. The measurement strategy had two beha-
vioral components: 1) pick up the cardboard, and 2) put the cardboard
over the pegs. The time limit for this problem was 1 minute.
Pie problem . The ten pie pieces were presented scattered on
the tray, the five red and five blue pieces mixed together, no
pieces overlapping or touching. The experimenter explained that
the objects represented pieces of blueberry and cherry pie and
the child was asked whether there was more blueberry or cherry pie
to eat, or if they were the same. There were two possible measure-
ment strategies, each with 3 components. The first strategy was to:
1) form pie A; 2) form pie B; and 3) indicate extra area in red pie.
The second strategy was to: 1) compare a piece of red pie with a
smaller piece of blue pie; 2) match every red piece to a blue piece;
and 3) notice extra area in the red pie. The time limit for this
problem was 2 minutes.
Sand contai ner problem
. The orientation of the containers
when presented to the child were such that none were stacked and
the 6 short containers were between the two tall ones. The tall
and short containers were pointed out to the child, as containers
that can carry sand at the beach, and the child was asked which
set (the 2 tall ones or the 6 short ones) could carry more sand,
or if the two sets could hold the same. If the child answered
the question correctly without interacting with the objects, the
question was rephrased as: "If all these containers (e.g., large)
hold red sand and all these (e.g., small) hold blue sand, is there
more red sand or blue sand or do they have the same?". The measure-
ment strategy had 3 components: 1) begin to stack the short containers;
2) stack the short containers (unusual patterns were copied on the
data sheet); and 3) compare the stacks of short containers with the
tall containers. The time limit for this problem was 2 minutes.
Caterpillar block problem . The caterpillars were presented
to the child vertically, about 5 cm. apart. The experimenter ex-
plained that the block pillars represented caterpillars, "Fuzzy"
and "Wuzzy", who were made of block sections. The child was asked
if "Fuzzy" or "Wuzzy" had more blocks or if they had the same. The
measurement strategy had one component, compare the heights of the
two pillars. The time limit for this problem was 1 minute.
i^or^eame^. After the child completed the five problems, the
experimenter asked the child to recall and draw the objects used in
each individual problem. The order in which the child was asked to
recall the problem materials was the same as the order in which they
had been presented. Each problem was cued by the name that was given
during the problem-solving segment of the experiment. "Squeaky" was
removed and the child told that there were no time limits regarding
the drawings. A new sheet of paper was provided for each drawing.
The experimenter said,
"Try to get a picture in your mind of the things that were on
the tray during the problem. Think about the number of
things, their color, shape and everything about what the things
looked like. Try to draw the picture that's in your mind the best
you can."
The child was asked to tell the experimenter if s/he made a
mistake or if something was too difficult to draw. After completing
each drawing the child was asked to confirm aspects of the drawing.
The experimenter asked,
"Are these the colors you saw? Are these the number of things
that you saw? Is this everything that you remember about what the
things looked like?"
Any verbal amendments to the drawings were noted and scored as if
they had been drawn.
After the session had ended, the experimenter scored each of the
drawings for recall accuracy. The data sheet for each of the pro-
blems had a checklist of potential drawing features (See Appendix A
for specific features). Each drawing feature may have been one of
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four types: 1) a feature relevant to having executed a counting
strategy (C); 2) a feature relevant to having executed a measurement
strategy (M)
; 3) a feature relevant to having executed a counting
or measurement strategy (M & C); and 4) an irrelevant feature
whether using a counting or measurement strategy. Each feature
depicted in a drawing or provided in the child's verbal statement
was checked off on the datasheet.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Strategy Choices
An overview of strategy choice on each of the five problems is
provided in Figure 1. Measurement was the predominant strategy on
the ping pong, pie and sand container problems, whereas counting was
most frequently employed on the pegboard and caterpillar problems.
Although the use of perceptual strategies was rare overall, the high
incidence on the sand container problem, particularly among girls,
may partly be due to the fact that counting wasn't necessary to
execute a comparison of number. Some of the children may have been
subitizing, making rapid number judgements based on perceptual
rather than counting operations (Klahr and Wallace, 1976). Sub-
itizing, however, would imply an incorrect answer, on the sand con-
tainer problem. Only 42% of the perceptual strategies, on this
problem, resulted in an incorrect answer, indicating individual
reasoning differences in use of a perceptual strategy. The ping
pong and pegboard problems could be solved using a counting or mea-
surement strategy but a measurement strategy was considered to be
optimal, in terms of time and ease of execution. The sand container
and pie problems required the use of measurement to yield the correct
solution, whereas the caterpillar problem required counting.
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Frequency of each Strategy by Task and Sex.
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Solution Time
Time to reach a final conclusion on each problem was recorded
for each child, but a preliminary analysis indicated extreme
variability and no significant effects. No further analyses have
been carried out on this measure.
Optimal Strategy Use
As can be seen in Figure 1, with the exception of the pegboard
problem, the optimal strategy was the most frequently chosen on
each of the problems. Recognizing and choosing the optimal strategy,
however, does not imply that the strategy was successfully executed
or that the resulting information would be correctly interpreted.
The percentage of children who chose an optimal strategy and pro-
vided a correct answer after executing that strategy is presented
in Table 1. Measurement strategies on the pie and sand container
problems were the most difficult to execute and interpret. Children
choosing this strategy, frequently reached incorrect conclusions,
regarding the solution. The discrepancy between number and size on
there problems was perplexing to many of the children. Several
children measured successfully, then opted for the numerical solution,
particularly on the pie problem. As shown in the table, the greatest
proportion of children used the optimal strategy correctly on the
problem requiring counting. The most difficult problem, in terms
of choosing the optimal strategy was the pegboard problem, whereas
the pie problem was most difficult to execute and interpret correctly.
Table 1
Pe rcentage of Children usi ng the Optimal Strategy
and Reaching the Correct Solution on each
of the Problems
Probl em
Caterpil lar
Ping Pong
Sand Containers
Pegboard
Pie
Optimal
Strategy
count
measure
measure
measure
measure
% Choosing
Strategy
83.05
64.41
61 .02
42.37
71 .19
% Optimal
and Correct
79.66
57.63
49.15
38.98
38.98
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Experti se
A reasonable measure of general expertise for these types of
problems was considered to be the number of times the child executed
the optimal strategy correctly. Each child received an expertise
score ranging from 0 to 5; zero indicated not using the optimal
strategy correctly on any of the problems and five indicated optimal
and correct strategy use on all of the problems. Although there is
apparent variability in this measure when plotted against age, as
seen in Figure 2, a general developmental trend is indicated, in
that older children tend to score higher on this expertise measure.
This finding is supported by the correlation between age and exper-
tise; r=.504, p < .001 , and accounting for 25% of the variance.
Eliminating Possible Age Effects
The predictions outlined in the introduction concern how the
dependent measures, strategy shifting and memory, will change with
the independent measure, expertise. Because memory and strategy
shifting may be considered to have a significant developmental
component, it is evident that the effect of age on the data would
depend on the range of ages in the sample. In other words, if a
developmental effect is evident in the data, age would be expected
to account for more of the variability on the dependent measure if
the breadth of the represented ages is large rather than small.
Since we are interested in underlying changes in behavior irrespective
of general developmental trends and since the breadth of ages in the
Fig. 2. Expertise Scale by Mean Age and Range
36
r: V
CO
IS)
LO
<u
CL
X
CO CNJ
ll ll
sample is large, it is necessary to eliminate significant varia-
bility on the dependent measures which can be attributed to
general development before testing for other factors that may
account for changes in performance. Therefore, if age was found
to be a significant predictor of the dependent measure, the
analysis was conducted hierarchically, first eliminating any
variability attributable to age. The three a priori predictions
concerning differences in problem solving behavior and memory
and how those differences relate to expertise, were tested using
these hierarchical multiple regression techniques and the results
are summarized in Table 2.
Strategy Shifting (Cumulative Strategies Employed)
The first prediction (A) was that a behavior, such as strategy
shifting on the problems, would be found to first increase and then
decrease as general problem knowledge or expertise increased.
Cumulative strategies employed, which is the number of counting
and measurement strategies used by each of the children over the
five problems, was computed as themeasureof strategy shifting. The
possible range of scores was from 0 to 10, with a score of 0 given
if the child used only a perceptual strategy on all of the problems
and 10 if both measurement and counting were used on all of the
problems.
Cumulative strategies employed was not found to be linearly or
curvil inearly related to age. Neither the linear nor curvilinear
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Table 2
Regressions Testing the Predictions
Prediction Independent
Variable
Predictor
Variables
Cumulative expertise
strategies (linear component)
employed
Sign
20322 .000
Total
R2
expertise
(quadratic comp.) .13833 .001 34156
B (1
)
Irrelevant
memory
age
(linear component) .36987 .000
age
(quadratic comp.) .03083 .095 .40069
B (2) Irrel evant
memory
age
(linear component)
experti se
(linear component)
.36987
.00069
.000
.805
experti se
(quadratic comp.
)
.07150 .010 .44206
C Irrelevant
memory
age .36987 .000
cumulative strat.
empl oyed .00367 .569 .37353
D Relevant age .37903 .000
memory
cumulative strat.
employed .09856 .002 .47759
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regressions using age as a predictor approached significance
(r = .1035, p<.435 and R =
.225, p<.232, respectively), and the
quadratic component did not contribute significantly to the regres-
sion (r = .0814, p < .130). Therefore the data were analized without
first eliminating variability attributable to age.
Figure 3 presents the mean number of cumulative strategies em-
ployed as a function of level of expertise, as well as, the expected
values of cumulative strategies employed using expertise as a predic-
tor. Expertise was found to be a significant predictor of cumulative
strategies employed, and indicated a significant quadratic component.
The quadratic component accounts for an additional 13.83% of the
variance (p<.001), after the variance attributable to the linear
component has been eliminated. The hypothesis that children at
mid-expertise levels tend to use both strategies more frequently than
high or low expertise children was therefore clearly supported.
Relation between Incidental Learning and Expertise
The second prediction (B) was that irrelevant memory would also
be a curvilinear function of expertise, and that expertise rather
than age would be a better predictor of the incidental learning
curve. Children at mid-expertise levels were expected to be searching
the stimuli for attributes relevant to appropriate strategy choice.
A consequence of this search was expected to be the delineation of
relevant from irrelevant attributes of the stimuli, and therefore
relatively increased processing of irrelevant information. As can
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Fig. 3. Obtained and Estimated Mean Values of Cumulative
Strategies Employed for each level of expertise.
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be seen in Table 2, there is a significant linear relationship be-
tween irrelevant memory and age, accounting for 37% of the variance
(p C001). Age, however, does not account for a significant quadra-
tic component of the remaining variance, accounting for only 3% of
the remaining variance (p<.095).
The second regression pertaining to prediction B in Table 2,
addresses whether a curvilinear relationship exists between expertise
and irrelevant memory. After the significant variability attributable
to general memory improvement with age was eliminated, expertise
accounted for a significant quadratic component of the remaining
variance (p < .01 ) . Expertise was a better predictor of the inciden-
tal learning curve than age. The hypothesis that mid-expertise
levels of problem solving knowledge lead to increased processing
of irrelevant information is thus supported.
Correspondence between Incidental Learning and Strategy Shifts
The third prediction (C) was that the behavior corresponding
to increased problem solving ambiguity (cumulative strategies em-
ployed or strategy shifting), would directly reflect increased
search to delineate relevant and irrelevant stimulus attributes
and would therefore be directly predictive of irrelevant memory.
In other words, irrelevant memory should increase with increased
strategy use. This prediction was not supported. As can be seen
in Table 2, after the effects of age were partialled from irrelevant
memory, cumulative strategies employed was not found to be a si
g-
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nificant predictor of the remaining variance, accounting for less
that 1% of that variance. It would appear that increased strategy
use does not directly increase irrelevant memory or reflect a process
of delineating relevant from irrelevant attributes of the stimuli.
Correspondence between Relevant Memory and Strategy Shifts
A finding (D), also summarized in Table 2, was not previously
postulated, but suggests that increased strategy use may directly
reflect increased processing of relevant problem information. After
variability attributable to age was removed from total relevant mem-
ory (i.e., memory for features pertaining to counting and/or
measurement), cumulative strategies employed was found to be a sig-
nificant linear predictor of the remaining variability (p<.002),
accounting for an additional 9.86% of the variance. This result
implies that the execution of diverse strategies is related to the
processing of information relevant to those strategies.
Sex Differences
A perplexing and unexpected result was a difference in male
and female performance in solving the problems. Table 3 provides
an overview of male and female differences on the expertise scale.
In general, a disproportionate number of males are found at the
higher end of the scale, while more females constitute the lower end
of the scale. Sex was found to be a significant predictor of exper-
tise (p < .001 ) , after variability attributable to age was removed,
Table 3
Sex Differences and Expertise
Ex Pert1se Total N Mean Age Sex n Mean Age
0 4 5yr.7mos. Male 0
Female 4 5yr.7mos
"I 12 5yr.7mos. Male 4 4yr.8mos
Female 8 6yr.0mos
2 14 6yr.3mos. Male 7 6yr.lmos
Female 7 6yr.5mos
3 11 6yr.7mos. Male 5 7yr.5mos
Female 6 7yr.3mos
4 7 7yr.4mos. Male 6 7yr.4mos
Female 1 7yr.lmos
5 11 7yr.6mos. Male 9 7yr.5mos
Female 2 8yr.4mos
Variance accounted for on Expertise Scale using
Age and Sex as Predictors
2 2
r.j Sign. R
Age .25407 .000
Sex .15315 .000 .40722
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accounting for an additional 15.31% of the variance.
In Table 4 the performance of males and females is compared on
a number of variables and the results of the t-tests reported.
Relevant and irrelevant memory measures did not differ significantly
for girls and boys. Males provided more correct answers than females
but the difference between the two groups also did not reach sig-
nificance.
When expertise was compared, however, boys scored significantly
higher that girls (p < .001 ) and this was true even when the two
problems in which either strategy could be used were removed from the
analysis (p < . 001 ) . Even the high incidence of perceptual strategy
use by girls on the sand container problem does not account for the
difference. Excluding the dual strategy and sand container problem
from the analysis, so that performance on the pie and caterpillar
problems were the only remaining scores resulted in a significant
difference (p < .004)
.
Overall, boys used more strategies: The difference in cumulative
strategies employed was significant (p < .005) . The boys were more
interactive with the objects and this may account for some of the
sex difference in expertise.
Table 4
T-tests comparing Males and Femal es
Variable Sex Mean S .D. Sign
Relevant Memory Male
Female
13.032
11 .786
4
4
.693
.841
.320
Irrelevant
Memory
Male
Female
19.452
19.500
6
6
.376
.658
.977
Total Correct
Answers
Male
Female
3.968
3.464
1 .110
.881
.058
Experti se Male
Femal
e
1 .929
1
1 .386
. uuu
Expertise
(excluding dual
strategy problems)
Male
Female
2.129
1.179
.806
.905
.000
Expertise
(excluding dual
strategy & sand
container problem)
Male
Femal
1 .419
.929
.564
.663
.004
Cumulative
Strategies
Employed
Male
Female
6.000
4.929
1
1
.489
.342
.005
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Evidence for a Model
How do children learn appropriate problem solving strategies?
Although this study was not designed to directly address the causes
of learning, the pattern of correlational results would seem to
point to the following theoretical model depicting learning to solve
quantitative problems in which either counting or measurement may be
an appropriate strategy.
This model would describe the child as initially, tending to
rely on counting as a strategy, regardless of the problem. Then the
child begins to recognize ambiguity as to strategy within the
problem, and searches for features which are relevant to the
applicable strategies. A consequence of this search is increased
processing of irrelevant stimulus information. Once the child is
able to isolate those features which are relevant to the strategy
alternatives, s/he engages in experimentation, executing both
strategies in solving the problem. During this phase, the child
tends to focus on attributes which are relevant to both strategies,
attempting to resolve apparent discrepencies and to integrate the
information into a single comprehensive system of understanding.
Once an integrated system is developed and strategy choice is again
unambiguous, the child no longer focuses on the problem information
which is relevant to the inappropriate strategy.
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Although some aspects of the model are more strongly supported
than others, in the main, it characterizes the systematic changes
in the data. A major strength of the model would seem to be the
emphasis on the predisposition of the child and the nature of the
task in determining information processing.
The model and Piaget
.
No attempt has been made, in this model, to
relate what is being learned to Piaget' s major stages of development.
As indicated in the introduction, the global character of Piagetian
theory appears to cloud rather than clarify the particulars of
transitions in the child's learning. This model and findings are
supportive of the basic tenets of Piaget 's theory of progressive
equilibration. Moreover, it goes beyond Piaget in specifying how
information will be processed differently at each stage of the
child's learning.
Of course, we still don't know whether uncertainty, discomfort,
of conflict, spur the process of learning, rather than, perhaps,
biological programming, curiosity, or a natural tendency to search
for stimulation. Regardless, it would appear that a series of events
occur within the child aimed toward resolving problem ambiguity,
and those events are tied to existing cognitive structures rather
than chronological age. The fact that strategy shifting is observed
to increase and then decrease as expertise increases, supports the
notion of increased experimentation with assumed increases in per-
ceived problem ambiguity. These findings support several of Piaget'
s
fundamental ideas, namely: 1) The child is an active learner,
2) This activity is geared toward resolving perceived environmental
ambiguity and 3) The learning process involves experimentation and
the observation and interpretation of environmental feedback.
A developmental trend is
apparent in the data, in that a counting problem is most easily
recognized and the strategy most readily adopted by the younger
children. Recognition of measurement as an appropriate strategy,
in problems which involve more than two elements for comparison,
appears to be learned after recognition of counting problems. In
other words, counting seems to be the default strategy for young
children in solving quantitative problems.
Incidental memory. Although there may be a developmental component
to changes in incidental memory there is also a learning component,
in that, incidental memory increases with perceived environmental
ambiguity. The fact that expertise rather than age was the sig-
nificant predictor of the curvilinear function of incidental
memory provides support for this contention. Like strategy shifting,
incidental memory appears to increase with expected increases in
perceived ambiguity. The facts that: 1) incidental learning was
found to be related to expertise, and 2) an incidental learning
curve was found between the ages of 4 and 9, are not trivial.
Previous inconsistencies in the literature, with regard to differ-
ences as to when incidental learning begins to decrease (Gibson, 1969:
Hawkins, 1973), may begin to be explained if incidental learning is no
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longer considered strictly as a age effect but also as a potential
byproduct of task and motivation effects in learning.
Whether incidental learning plays an important role in the
generation of rules or transfer of learning is not directly
addressed in this study. The results do suggest, however, that
a more conservative stance is warranted than the position espoused
by Stevenson (1973), that irrelevant information is detrimental to
younger children's learning. Children are first processing, and
then learning to disregard, the irrelevant information and that
sequence appears to be tied to problem-solving sophistication.
Learning to deal with incidental information then, is perhaps a
fundamental aspect of the learning process, and of possible sig-
nificance regarding the breadth or depth of learning.
Relation between memory and strategy shifting
. A major advantage
of the approach taken in this study is that it permitted the
distinction between irrelevant and relevant information in memory.
The distinction appears to be important since the two types of
information relate differently to strategy shifting behaviors.
Relevant memory
.
A direct linear relationship was found between
relevant memory and strategy shifting. Increased direct experimen-
tation in the problem, as evidenced by strategy shifting, appears
to relate to increased memory of features relevant to both strategies
A reasonable hypothesis, therefore, is that strategy shifting be-
haviors help to isolate and integrate the information which is
relevant to both strategies into a single comprehensive system of
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understanding. This hypothesis would have been further supported
if a curvilinear relationship had been found between relevant
memory and expertise, suggesting that once the integrated system
was relatively solid and complete, the information relevant to the
inappropriate strategy would cease to be remembered. Perhaps, if
the sample had included more sophisticated subjects such a result
would have been found.
Irrelevant memory
.
An interesting question arises given the
results of this study. If strategy shifting and irrelevant memory
are related curvi 1 inearly to expertise, then why isn't a linear
relationship found between strategy shifting and irrelevant memory?
Figure 4 addresses this question by depicting predicted curves for
cumulative strategies employed and irrelevant memory as functions
of expertise. The predicted curves are found by using the beta
weights generated from the regressions which were previously reported
under prediction A and prediction B(2) in Table 2. The cumulative
strategies employed curve is identical to the estimated curve in
Figure 3. The predicted curve for irrelevant memory for each level
of expertise is depicted with age held constant. Although the actual
predicted values would change with age, the same curvilinear function
would be attained at any single age level. As can be seen in Figure
4, the peak of the projected curve for irrelevant memory occurs at
a lower level of expertise than the peak of the strategy shifting
curve. If the two curves were superimposed, peaking at the same
point, the correlation between irrelevant memory and cumulative
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Fig. 4. Estimated Values of Y as cumulative strategies
employed and irrelevant memory (age held constant) as a function
of expertise.
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strategies employed would have been linear and positive as theorized.
Two possible explanations, as to why a correlation was not found,
will be explored.
The first explanation starts with the hypothesis that a positive
linear relation really does exist between irrelevant memory and
strategy shifting. The argument can be made that the curves are not
superimposed because of idiosyncratic aspects of one particular
problem. To be exact, the pie problem, which was the most difficult
to resolve, had few irrelevant features, all of which were usually
recalled. In fact, there was virtually no variability in the
irrelevant memory measure on this problem, and a severe ceiling effect.
Yet, this problem induced more strategy shifting behavior than any
other (See Figure 1). As a result, the irrelevant memory curve
may be depressed at high expertise levels.
In contrast, the second explanation considers the curve to
be accurately depicting consecutive cognitive processes. Perhaps
two distinct stages toward resolving problem ambiguity are being
reflected, and the search for relevant features of the stimuli and
consequent increased incidental memory, truly precedes strategy
experimentation. In other words, the child may have a relatively
firm understanding of which features are relevant to both strategies,
before s/he begins to explore and execute both strategies. This
explanation is consistent with the finding that relevant memory
increases with increases in strategy use.
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SSSOofthejEsW. In summary, on the basis of thgse ^.^
the following model of how the child learns appropriate quantitative
strategy choices appears reasonable:
First, the unsophisticated child tends to rely on counting as
a strategy for quantitative problems requiring comparisons of more
than two objects.
Secondly, the child recognizes some problem ambiguity as to
appropriate strategy, and searches to delineate those aspects of the
problem which determine strategy. A consequence of this search is
increased processing of irrelevant problem information.
Third, after isolating features relevant to the alternative
strategies, the child begins to experiment with the strategies by
tending to shift strategies, the child is focusing on features
relevant to both strategies and probably is attempting to resolve
any perceived inconsistencies which may arise.
Finally, after the child has resolved inconsistencies among
strategies and has developed an integrated system of understanding
the problem, information relevant to inappropriate strategies is
no longer a focus of the child's attention.
It is worth reiterating that this model is based on correla-
tional evidence from a study which is a first attempt to deal with
these complicated issues. Certainly, more evidence is necessary
before any firm conclusions regarding a comprehensive theory can be
drawn. Despite the necessarily approximate nature of the details of
the model, one general statement can surely be made. Memory, whether
relevant or irrelevant, is clearly related to both the predispo-
sition of the child and the nature of the problem. Although memory
has been found to improve with age, what and how much is remembered
is also determined by circumstance, and it is this determination
which, although it may not always be the more statistically sig-
nificant, has the stronger implication for learning.
Sex Differences
It is evident that the general model hypothesized above will
have to be elaborated to account for individual differences. Strong
sex differences were obtained with regard to expertise and strategy
shifting, but not with respect to total number correct, irrelevant
memory or relevant memory. Further research will of course be
necessary before such individual differences in problem resolution
can be specified exactly. Nevertheless, we can begin to explore
the question of why these sex differences emerged, by reviewing
potentially relevant findings in the literature, and relating them
to these results.
Prior studies regarding sex differences .
Acti vi ty level . Of eighteen studies reviewed by Maccoby and
Jacklin (1974), concerning activity level in children between the
ages of 4 and 9, eight studies found boys to be significantly more
active than girls, and the remaining ten found no significant
differences. Those studies which found boys to be more active
included measurement of free play movement, environmental exploration,
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vigor at crank turning, and used teacher and child ratings of
activity level. Thus, there is relatively strong evidence to support
more overt physical activity by males, and certainly our finding that
boys scored significantly higher on cumulative strategies employed
is consistent with these prior results.
Field dependence-independence
. Although there is a great deal
of literature claiming greater field independence in males, the
actual meaning of field independence in terms of cognitive style is
not clear. In general, the tasks measuring field independence have
been spatial tasks such as the rod and frame test, in which the sub-
ject is asked to find true vertical with a tilted frame of reference,
and the embedded figures test. Differences in performance on these
tasks have been generally interpreted as indicating degree of self-
reliance and aility to reason abstractly. Burstein et. al . (1980)
have suggested that this may be, in part, because younger children
and women tend to show more field dependence. It is unfortunate
that a potentially informative sex difference has been distorted in
this fashion. What the tasks actually measure is spatial field
independence or the ability to ignore contextual cues on spatial
tasks, which may be an asset in solving problems which are not pre-
sented in a practical context.
In this sense, field independence may have been a factor in
the problems presented in this study. For example, the ping pong
ball problem does not provide a realistic context. If the balls
had been eggs, and the paint tray an egg carton, the context would
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have been more realistic and perhaps more strongly suggestive of a
measurement strategy. The point is, that in the ping pong ball
problem and others, contextual cues with regard to function were
irrelevant in determining the solution, and the ability to ignore
such contextual cues, as did exist, would be an advantage. If boys
are truly more field independent, this may have been a factor contri-
buting to their superior performance on these tasks. The idea is
particularly intriguing in that future research tasks could be
designed such that either field dependence or field independence
could provide an advantage, and consequently differential performance
could be predicted for girls and boys.
Breaking with set . Another intriguing and suggestive finding in
the literature on sex differences is supposedly greater ability in
males to break with a learning set in solving problems. Although
other tasks have been designed to test this ability, the classic
problem is the Luchins water jar problem. After solving several
relatively complex problems with similar solution procedures, the
subject is given a problem in which both the former solution strategy
and a simpler strategy can be applied. Finally, the child is given
a problem which requires the simpler strategy. Boys have tended
to do better than girls on these final problems (Maccoby and Jacklin,
1974).
Cunningham (1965) found no significant difference between boys
and girls, aged 7 to 12 years, in susceptibility to set on the
Luchins water jar problem (i.e., tendency to stick with the more
complex solution when either is appropriate). He did find,
however, that boys were more likely to break with set on the problem
requiring the simpler solution. Interestingly, he found no sig-
nificant difference between boys and girls in the ability to break
set on an alphabet maze problem, which demanded analyti cal -verbal
abilities rather than analytical
-spati al abilities.
The ability to break with set may have been a factor in our
study, particularly since counting appears to be the dominant set
among younger children and measurement was the optimal strategy on
4 of the 5 problems. The fact that the problems required restruc-
turing on a spatial dimension may have been a critical factor in
determining superior male performance on expertise. Similarly, the
significant difference in cumulative strategies employed may, in
part, be due to reluctance by girls to restructure the problem away
from a preexisting strategy.
General spatial abilities . In general, spatial abilities are
thought to consist of factors such as spatial orientation (i.e.,
perception of the position and configuration of objects in space
with the observer as a reference point) and spatial visualization
(i.e., manipulation of parts of a stimulus while maintaining a
mental image of the relationship among the parts) (Yen, 1975).
A review by Burstein et. al . (1980) points out that previous reviewers
have disagreed as to when differences in spatial ability begin to
emerge. Oetzel (1966) found that boys performed better than girls
on 14 of the 19 studies reviewed and the remaining 5 studies
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found no significant difference, and that superior male performance
began to emerge between the ages of 6 and 8 years. In contrast,
Maccoby and Jack! in (1974), who reviewed over 30 studies, found no
consistent sex differences in spatial ability until adolescence,
when boys began to excel 1.
There can be no doubt that males perform significantly better
than females on spatial tasks, and that spatial ability was a
component of our research. However, in considering this factor, we
must disagree with Maccoby and Jacklin's position that the differences
emerge at adolescence, because we found sex differences before age 9.
In summary there is strong evidence that males score higher on
activity level, field independence, ability to break set on spatial
problems and general spatial ability measures. The tasks designed
for this study tap all of these abilities, and consequently any one
of these factors or combination of factors may have contributed to
the sex differences found in this research.
Problems with research on sex differences . It is worth pointing out
that on each measure of cognitive ability the difference between the
sexes tends to be small relative to the differences within each sex.
A danger exists in attempting to predict an individual's cognitive
style and abilities based on group membership alone. This is not
to say, however, that sex differences are not worth exploring or not
of major importance. Even though the difference due to sex may not
be the most prominent effect in the data it may be important in
terms of practical application (Burstein, et. al . 1980).
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if the differences can be attributable to the use
of different cognitive strategies or learning sets by
men and women, such knowledge could be useful in the
education of both, regardless of the ultimate etiology
of such differences. Indeed, it should also lead to
a search for reliable predictor variables and methods
of manipulating them." (p. 296)
Unfortunately in much of the literature on sex differences,
evidence of sex differences in performance on particular tasks has
been generalized beyond the tasks to general personality traits.
As a result, for example, women have been labeled as dependent,
conforming, submissive, non-analytical and childlike, on the basis
of performance on embedded figures, rod and frame, water jar and
other such tasks. This excessive overinterpretation of results,
frequently based on sexual stereotypes, has unfortunately undermined
an important area of scientific inquiry. Consequently, the objective
pursuit of potentially important differences has been hindered.
Perhaps, in the future, findings which relate to individual differences
will be respected and appreciated for what they reveal about the
variety of human potential.
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Name
"
- time: 1 minute
DOB
Sex Date
Task 1 - Ping Pong Balls
Behaviors
.
Doesn't interact with objects
_
Begins counting balls
Counts all balls
Begins counting slots
Counts all slots
Places a ball in slot
Places all balls in slots
Notices remaining slot
Correct response
Incorrect response
Other Behaviors:
Drawing Features
(C & M) One more slot than balls
(M) Balls same size as slots
(C) Number of slots on tray (10)
(C) Number of balls (9)
Shape of tray (round)
Color of tray (silver)
Writing on tray
Color of balls (yellow)
Color of balls (white)
Number of yellow balls (4)
Number of white balls (5)
Writing on balls
Bowl in picture
Color of bowl (orange)
Indent on tray
Cone shape to bowl
4 of one color and 5 of another color
raw count
M relevant
C relevant
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Name
DOB
Behaviors
time: 1 minute
Sex Date
Task 2 - Pegboard
Doesn't interact with objects
Begins counting pegs
Ends counting pegs
Begins counting rings
Ends counting rings
Picks up card
Puts card on pegboard
Correct Response
Incorrect Response
Other Behaviors
Drawing Features
(C & M) Same number holes and pegs
(M) Shape of pegs (square)
(M) Shape of holes (square)
(M) Same shape to holes and pegs
(C) Number of pegs (8)
(C) Number of holes (8)
Color of pegs (red)
Color of rings (blue) Raw count
Color of rings (pink)
Color of rings (yellow) M relevant
Color of rings (green)
Number of blue rings (2) C relevant
Number of pink rings (2)
Number of yellow rings (2)
Number of green rings (2)
No rings of same color adjacent
Different outline shapes to rings
Petal shape to ring(s)
Square shape to rings ($')
Square or petal shape to blue ring only
- _ time: 2 minutes
Date
Task 3 - Pies
Doesn't interact with objects
Begins counting set 1
Ends counting set 1
Begins counting set 2
Ends counting set 2
Forms pie 1
Forms pie 2
Compares sizes of formed pies
Compares a piece of pie 1 with pie 2
Compares every piece of pie 1 with pie 2
Correct Response
Incorrect Response
Other behaviors:
Name
DOB
Sex
Behaviors
Drawing Features
Color of pie (blue)
Color of pie (red)
(M) Shape of pie pieces (wedge) Raw count
(M) Wedges different arc sizes
(C) Number of red pieces (5) M relevant
(C) Number of blue pieces (5)
(C) Same number red and blue pieces C relevant
(M) Red has more area
69
Name
DOB
Sex Date
Behaviors
time: 2 minutes
Task 4 - Sand Containers
Doesn't interact with objects
Begins to count set 1
Ends counting set 1
Begins counting set 2
Ends counting set 2
Begins stacking small containers
Ends stacking small containers
Compares stacks with tall containers
Correct Response
Incorrect Response
Other Behaviors
Drawing Features
(M) Large to small ratio more than 1 to 3
(C) Number of large containers (2)
(C) Number of small containers (6)
Color of tops (orange or red)
Color of tops (brown) Raw count
Color of tops (white)
Number of red/orange tops (2) M relevant
Number of white tops (2)
Number of brown tops (4) C relevant
Orange tops on large containers only
Different color tops
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Name
DOB
time: 1 minute
Sex Date
Task 5 - Caterpillar Blocks
Behaviors
Doesn't interact with objects
_
Begins counting set 1
Ends counting set 1
Begins counting set 2
Ends counting set 2
-
Compares heights of towers
Correct Response
Incorrect Response
Other Behaviors
Drawing Features
(M) Caterpillars same length (within a block)
(C) Number of blue blocks (4)
(C) Number of green blocks (5)
(C) One more block in a caterpillar
Color of blocks (green) Raw count
Color of blocks (blue)
Face drawn on caterpillars relevant
Face in circle
Red mouths on both caterpillars C relevant
Blue eyes on green caterpillar
Green eyes on blue caterpillar
Small blocks and large blocks


